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COMMENT
EXAMINING THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION TO THE TAKINGS
CLAUSE: IS THERE LIFE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS AFTER LUCAS?
INTRODUCTION

Justice Holmes once observed that the public interest m its natural
resources is "omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more
pressing as [the] population grows."1 In tis statement, Holmes acknowledged what John Locke had understood to be the greatest challenge to the private ownership of property, the end of common property.
Locke wrote that it is "the taking
[of] what is common, and removing it out of the state Nature leaves it in, which begins the property, without which the Common is of no use." 2 Locke knew that his labor theory
of property was valid only where there was no prejudice to any other
person. But Locke was unable to envision such a dilemma, where there
was no property left unclaimed. He assumed that there would always be
unclaimed property; perhaps, not in Europe, but certainly in America.
We find ourselves confronted with a different reality. The common resources of this country are scarce, and the administration that runs this
government is only beginning to confront the dangers of continued unchecked development.
Today, the federal and state governments have been implementing
plans to protect certain ecologically sensitive property. Wetlands once
seen as a hinderance to development, with no purpose except to be filled,
are now recognized for their aesthetic beauty and for their contributions,
as protectors against pollution and as habitats for endangered plants and
animals. The beaches, overdeveloped and underprotected, are now
threatened with severe erosion, and houses, once built far from the beach,
suffer from flood damage resulting from even a normal storm.
President Clinton promises extensive regulations to protect the environment, but what happens to the people who own the property that will
bear the brunt of the regulations? Does the state, through its power of
eminent domain, have to buy all of the land that it wishes to regulate? If
the answer is yes, then the costs of such regulations will be prohibitively
high and the common resources of this country will continue to diminish.
But if the answer is no, is this result fair? Should a few people be.forced
to carry the burden of these regulations themselves?3
In 1992, the Supreme Court tried answering these questions in a series
1. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
2. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-

bridge Umversity Press 1988) (1690).
3. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that so many people live on the beaches
and on the floodplains (the land bordering rivers) because the property's location close to
water makes it so highly valued.
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of takings cases that culminated in the decision Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.4 In Lucas, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether a regulation, enacted to protect the beaches and dunes m South
Carolina, violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution if it prevented the owner of undeveloped property from building a
house.
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that a regulation that takes away all economic value of a piece of property is an unconstitutional taking that must be compensated. This rule is subject to
one exception. If the regulation is enacted for the primary purpose of
regulating a common law nuisance, the takings clause does not apply'
The Court then remanded the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court
to determine whether the state's common law nuisance doctrine was
broad enough to cover this regulation of property 6
The purpose of this Comment is not to criticize the Lucas decision but
to show how South Carolina and other states can continue to regulate the
development of wetlands, floodplams, beaches and other ecologically
threatened land without having to compensate the landowners. The
opinion of this author is that in most states, including South Carolina,
regulations to protect these types of sensitive lands will never be takings.
Part I reviews the nuisance exception to the takings clause, its origins
and its continuing vitality. There are two questions that must be answered here: (1) how do the courts interpret this exception; and (2) does
the nuisance exception apply even where a regulation has removed all
economic value of the land? Part II examines the Lucas decision, the
facts that the Court relied upon, and the facts that the Court ignored in
coming to its decision. Part III explores three sources of common law
nuisance on which states can rely in determining that there is no unconstitutional taking of a landowner's property Finally, this Comment concludes that, notwithstanding the decision of the South Carolina Supreme
Court on remand, states will be able to extensively regulate the use of
ecologically sensitive lands without having to compensate landowners.
I.

MUGLER AND ITS PROGENY: THE ORIGINS AND VITALITY OF
THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION TO THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

In Respublica v. Sparhawk,7 the court related a "memorable instance
of folly"' recorded in Clarendon's history:
[I]t is mentioned, that the Lord Mayor of London, in 1666, when that
city was on fire, would not give directions for, nor consent to, the pulling down forty wooden houses, or to the removing the furniture, &c.,
belonging to the lawyers of the temple, then on the circuit, for fear he
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
Id. at 2901.
Id. at 2901-02.
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (Pa. 1788).
Id. at 362.
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should be answerable for a trespass; and m consequence of this conduct, half that great city was burnt.9
The court understood that in certain cases, the government could take
away property from private landowners without compensation. In Sparhawk, 227 barrels of flour had been taken from their owner m order to
prevent the flour from falling into the hands of the approaching British
army.10 The court, stating that "the safety of the people is a law above
all others,"1 1I held that no compensation was due.1 2 While Sparhawk was
decided on the basis of necessity, it nonetheless presents an early example
of where the taking of private property was not compensable because its
purpose was to protect public safety.
The rapid urbamzation of the nineteenth century, created a need for
government to be able to regulate private property prospectively As the
cities grew, governments found themselves unable to deal with many of
the problems associated with rapid urbamzation. Ad hoc regulations on
the basis of necessity were insufficient.
Slums had appeared in New York City and Boston as early as 1815
and housing conditions deteriorated rapidly after 1830, in the years of
great urban growth and industrialization. Municipal water supply was
inadequate. The net result of these conditions was a prevalence of both
epidemic and endemic diseases. Mortality statistics indicated 13that
death rates rose in proportion to the degree of urban congestion.
While the government had been able to expand the railroads and the
telegraph system through a combination of eminent domain and a narrow defimtion of compensable property interests, this power was ineffective m the urban environment.1 4 Nuisance law was also viewed as
inadequate because it could only be applied after the harm had taken
place and because "of the lack of any single plaintiff with sufficient interest to bring a suit."1 5 Thus, the police power, a right for states to regu9. Id.
10. Id. at 358.
11. Id. at 362.
12. Id.
13. Scott A. Rezmick, Note, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Century America, 40 U. CHI. L. REV 854, 859 (1973) (citations omitted). One of
the problems faced by New York City and other large cities was the lack of a sanitation
system. As a result,
[p]nvies or waterclosets emptied into vaults or cesspools, and the waste material
soaked into the soil or was hauled away as receptacles became filled. Kitchen
waste was run into the street and left to evaporate or was led off by open drains
to watercourses. Ditches provided for this purpose often carried urine and fecal
matter as well as house slop, since privy facilities were often hopelessly inadequate in congested districts of cities.
Id. (quoting C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN AMERICA 87 (1967).
14. Id. at 854.
15. Id. at 860. The latter problem was caused both by the reluctance of plaintiffs to
bring a suit where the amount in controversy was small and by courts finding that plaintiffs had no standing to bring the suit. See, e.g., Smith v. Boston, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 254

290

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT

[Vol. IV

late property, was created as a remedy for the government. This power
was distinct from the power of eminent domain and limited by common
law nuisance and "a narrow application of the principle that no man
should use his property to injure that of Ins neighbors." 16
A.

The GradualDevelopment of the Nuisance Exception

The police power was firmly established in the case Mugler v. Kansas. In Mugler, the constitution of Kansas was amended to prohibit the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors except for medical, scientific
and mechanical purposes. 18 The appellant contended that his buildings
were erected prior to the adoption of the temperance amendment for the
purpose of manufacturing beer, and that the buildings could not be put
to any other use.19 The Court held that the state's police power extends
to the destruction of property when it acts to abate a nuisance through
remedial legislation.2" Where the business has become a nuisance to the
community in which it is located, the state's police powers provide a
legislative remedy to protect the public health.2 1
A prohibition
[on] the use of property
that [is] declared, by
valid legislation, injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot
be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property
for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in
the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict is
right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use
by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public
interests.2 2
(1851) (finding that plaintiff did not have standing in nuisance action even where his shop
was fronted by tram line).
16. Rezmick, supra note 13, at 862. This author believes that the purpose and history
of the police power provides the guidance for modem courts to apply the police power in
environmental takings cases. In the 1800's, the courts had come to the conclusion that if
the legislatures were not given greater power, the problems of the city could not be solved
because the costs would be too high. The environmental problems of the twentieth century are similar to the urban problems of the nineteenth century. The problems are vast
and there are no easy solutions. Today, important legislation is not feasible because the
states and the federal government are constrained by the takings clause and by the costs
of compensating landowners. To solve these problems, the courts must expand the nuisance exception to include the takings clause in the same way that the courts created this
exception to solve the urban problems.
17. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
18. Id. at 655.
19. Id. at 657.
20. Id. at 658.
21. Id. at 667.
22. Id. at 668-69. The Mugler Court did place one important restriction on this
doctrine.
[If] a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the
public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those
objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is
the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
Id. at 661.
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The Court in Mugler determined that the police power is conceptually
different from the power of eminent domain and that regulations pursuant to this police power were not compensable.2 3
In Mugler, the nuisance prohibited was the manufacturing and sale of
alcohol. The legislature decided that this activity had always been a nuisance; m other words, a nuisance per se. In the next important nuisance
case, Hadacheck v. Sebastian,24 the regulated activity was not a nuisance
per se, but a nuisance because of where it was located. The City of Los
Angeles made it unlawful to operate a brickyard within the limits of the
city because the smoke from the brickyard's operation was harmful to
the public.25 The Court upheld the ordinance because it was a proper
exercise of the police power; a residential neighborhood was not a proper
location for a brickyard.
The Court implied, however, that if the regulation had taken all value
of the property, the ordinance would have effected a compensable taking.26 But the Court did not need to address this question because it
found value left in the property. "[T]here is no prohibition of the removal of the brick clay; only a prohibition
of its manufacture into
bricks."2 7 Thus, the Hadacheck Court extended the Mugler doctrine to
cases that were not nuisances per se.
The expansion of the police power doctrine came to a temporary halt
thirteen years later. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2" the principles
laid out in Mugler were examined and limited. In his now famous declaration, Justice Holmes said that "while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."" His theory was different from that expressed m Mugler While
the Mugler Court reasoned that there was a fundamental difference between the power of eminent domain and the police power, Holmes believed that the difference between the two was only a matter of degree.30
23. Rezmck, supra note 13, at 869.
24. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
25. Id. at 408.
26. Id. at 411. In support of this position, the Court cites a California case, Exparte
Kelso, 82 P 241 (Cal. 1905) where it was held that an ordinance that absolutely prohibited the operation of a stone quarry was void because it totally deprived the owner of the
use of his property. A partial regulation would have been allowed.
27. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 412.
28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In this case the rights of the coal company to mine under
certain property were taken away by way of the Koher Act. The courts m Pennsylvania
had recognized three estates in mining property: (1) the right to use the surface; (2) the
ownership of the subjacent minerals; and (3) the right to have the surface supported by
the subjacent strata. Id. at 395. In this case, the third estate was owned by the coal
company, but under the Kohler Act, the coal company was not permitted to mine. Id. at
412.
29. Id. at 415.
30. This theory, known as the "continuum of appropriation" was first stated by
Holmes in a decision while he was still sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
court.
[Tihe difference [between the police power and eminent domain] is only one of

292

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT [Vol. IV

When the government regulation of property "reaches a certain magmtude, in most if not in all cases there must be
an exercise of eminent
31
domain and compensation to sustain the act."1
Holmes also understood that not every application of the police power
would be exempt from the takings clause. Only those regulations
designed to abate a public nuisance (a subset of the greater police power)
would be exempted from compensation.
This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a public
interest even m this, as there is in every purchase and sale and in all
that happens within the commonwealth. Some existing rights may be
modified even in such a case. But usually in ordinary private affairs the
public interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference. A
source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance even if sinmilar damage is inflicted on others m different places. The damage is not
common orpublic
If we were called upon to deal with the plaintiffs' position alone, we should think it clear that the statute does not
disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive
3 2 a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights.
Holmes limited the regulation of private property without compensation to cases where the regulation was enacted to abate narrowly defined
public nuisances. Further, even where the regulation was designed to
abate a nuisance, it could be a taking if the regulation was too extensive.
In Mahon, the public interest in the Kohler Act was limited because the
Act did not apply to land where the same person owned the mining
rights and the surface rights. 3 In addition, the rule could not be justified
as a protection of public safety because that 34
purpose was satisfied by the
requirement of timely notice before mining.

Mahon did not address whether the nuisance exception would be applied in cases where the deprivation was total. Although there was a
complete taking of the support estate, the majority refused to characterize the decision as a nuisance case.35
If Mahon was a retrenchment after Hadacheck, standing for the primdegree: most differences are, when nicely analyzed.
[D]ifference of degree is
one of the distinctions by which the right of the Legislature to exercise the
police power is determined. Some small limitations of previously existing rights
incident to property may be imposed for the sake of preventing a manifest evil;
larger ones could not be, except by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 372-73 (1889) (citation omitted).
31. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
32. Id. at 413-14 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 414.

34. Id.
35. The dissent of Justice Brandeis does not help us in this regard either. Brandeis
believed that this was a nuisance case. "The restriction here in question is merely the
prohibition of a noxious use." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). However, he also believed that there was not a complete deprivation of the property. "If we
are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we should compare it
with the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the value not of the coal alone,
but with the value of the whole property." Id. at 419.
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ciple that the prevention of a nuisance was going to be the only situation
where extensive regulation was allowed and that nuisance was going to
be defined narrowly, the Mahon thinking was quickly abandoned. From
the late twenties until the late eighties, there were two incremental extensions of the nuisance exception. The first phase was the elimination of
the requirement that the regulation had to prohibit a common law nuisance. This period is defined by two cases, Miller v. Schoene3 6 and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead 31 The second phase was a greater widening
of this doctrine so that nuisance was no longer required to except a government action from the constraints of the takings clause. The only requirement was that the regulation be a valid exercise of the police power
in furtherance of the public interest. This period is defined by two recent
38
Supreme Court decisions, Penn Central Transp. Co. v.39 New York City
and Keystone Bituminous CoalAssn. v. DeBenedictis.
B.

The End of the Common Law Requirement

While the early cases focused on whether the regulated act was a common law nuisance, the courts soon recognized that nuisance was not a
static doctrine. In Miller, the Court was faced with the question of
whether these legislative nuisances would be covered under the nuisance
exception.
Under section 1 of the Cedar Rust Act of Virginia, it was declared
unlawful for any person to "own, plant or keep alive and standing" on
his property any red cedar tree which was the source or might be the
source of cedar rust.4° Rust infected trees, growing within a certain radius from any apple orchard, were declared a public nuisance and were
to be destroyed.4 1 The property owners in Miller brought an action to
prevent the destruction of their cedar trees, arguing that this was an unconstitutional taking of their property.
The Miller Court held that there was no taking, despite the fact that at
common law, it was not a nuisance to grow ornamental cedar trees (even
those infected with cedar rust disease). The legislature decided that
cedar trees carrying the rust disease were a nuisance. However, the
Court did not see the need to "weigh with nicety the question whether
36. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
37. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). As an aside, Mano Cuomo, now Governor of the State of
New York and once a potential Bill Clinton nominee for the Supreme Court, was one of
the attorneys for the town of Hempstead.
38. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
39. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
40. Miller, 276 U.S. at 277.
41. Id.
[C]edar rust is an infectious plant disease in the form of a fungoid organism
which is destructive of the fruit and foliage of the apple, but without effect on
the value of the cedar.
The only practicable method of controlling the disease and protecting apple trees from its ravages is the destruction of all red
cedar trees, subject to the infection, located within two miles of apple orchards.

Id. at 278-79 (citations omitted).
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the infected cedars constitute[d] a nuisance according the common law;
or whether they may be so declared by statute."'42
This expansion of the nuisance exception was explained further in
Goldblatt. In this case, the property owner was a company that had
mined sand and gravel on a site since 1927. 4" After one year of mining,
the excavation reached the water table and the excavated crater became a
twenty-acre lake.' The town proceeded to grow, and in 1958, the town
amended its ordinance regulating such excavations, to prohibit any excavation below two feet above the maximum ground water level at the
site.45 The excavation reached this level in 1927, so pursuant to the ordinance, no further excavation could take place and the mining stopped.
The mining company argued that all economic use of the land had been
taken away, and, as a defense, the town argued that the measure was
enacted to protect the safety of the community.46 Citing Mugler, the
Court held that a regulation designed to protect the public safety could
not be a taking. Further, the Court noted that "it is [not] of controlling
significance
that the use prohibited [gravel mining] is not a common
law nuisance."'4 7 Thus, after Miller and Goldblatt, the Court consistently
held that the common law defirntion of nuisance did not lint the nuisance exception. If the legislature decided that an activity is a nuisance,
it could regulate that activity without compensating affected property
owners.
C. Extending the Nuisance Exception to All Valid Applications

of the Police Power
The exception, as envisioned, was limited to cases where the legislature
was regulating a nuisance. In the 1980's, the Court expanded this excep42. Id. at 280. The Court did not have to ask whether the nuisance exception applies
even where there is a total taking of all economic use, recognizing that ornamental cedar
trees were occasionally harvested for lumber. Id. at 279. It is clear that the property
owner did not value these trees for their harvest potential. Miller and Hadacheck seem to
stand for a general principle that the Court should look for value, even if that value was
not that which was held by the property owner.
43. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 592 n.i.
46. It is unclear what public safety justification the town was arguing. There is language in the opimon suggesting that the water filled gravel pit was an attractive nuisance
and dangerous to children. Id. at 595. However, halting further excavation in order to
protect the children does not make much sense since the pit was already 25 feet deep.
The Court seems to believe that preventing further deepening of this pit would have had a
minimal effect on public safety. Id. Nevertheless, the Court was unable to take notice of
this fact. Id. The author speculates that the town undertook this legislation for fear that
mining under the water table would damage the water supply.
47. Id. at 593. The problem is that this seems to be the best case where the regulation
prohibited all use of the property. The Court does not address this issue because the
mining company did not meet the burden of showing that all economic use was taken
away. "[T]here is no evidence in the present record which even remotely suggests that
prohibition of further mining will reduce the value of the lot in question." Id. at 594.
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tion. Instead of focusing on whether the regulation was enacted to abate
a nuisance, the Court asked whether the regulation was made pursuant
to the state's police power. These recent decisions made no distinction
between harm-preventing regulations and benefit-conferring regulations.
So long as there was a legitimate state interest, a regulation would not be
a taking. In cases like Penn Central, the government's ability to enact
land-use regulations was greatly expanded.
Pursuant to New York City's Landmark Preservation Law,4" the
owner of a landmark building was required to keep the exterior features
"in good repair," and any plans to alter the exterior of the building had
to be approved by the Comnxission. 49 The owners of Grand Central Station, a historical landmark,5 ° wanted to build a fifty-five story office
building on top of the terminal and they submitted a plan to the
Landmark Commission. 51 When the proposal was denied, the owners
brought an action against the city claiming that the regulation was excesrequired compensation
sive and that it was a taking of their property that
52
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
This was not a nuisance case. The majority opinion never used the
term nuisance. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Ins dissent, "the proposed addition to the Grand Central Terminal would be in full compliance with zonmg, height limitations, and other health and safety
requirements."5 3 Mugler and the earlier cases based this exception on
nuisance, but in Penn Central,Justice Brennan redefined this exception.
Valid exercises of the police power do not depend on the " 'noxious'
quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restricextions were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy,
Thus, the Court
pected to produce a widespread public benefit. .
held that as long as the restrictions imposed are "substantially related to,
the promotion of the general welfare," there is no taking of the
property.5 5
The Keystone Court relied on this interpretation when deciding a case
48. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 205-1.0(a) (1976).
49. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 111-12.
50. Grand Central Station was "regarded not only as providing an ingenious engineermg solution to the problems presented by urban railroad stations, but also as a magnificent example of the French beaux-arts style." Id. at 115.
51. Id. at 116-17.
52. Id. at 119.
53. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 134 n.30.
55. Id. at 138. It is the author's opinion that this case is wrongly decided for two
reasons: (1) Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in Mahon, stated that he felt that the proper
bundle of property to look at was the combined mining and support estates because they
were part of the same plot of land, the same property interest. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 419. It
seems unlikely that Brandeis would have held that Penn Central's various real estate
holdings in the neighborhood of Grand Central Station were akin to a single property
interest; and (2) while the holding in Keystone can be properly justified under the nuisance exception, the Penn Central Court can in no way be justified under this doctrine.
To open this can of worms would create an exception that swallows the rule. If Penn
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whose facts were almost identical to the Mahon case decided almost fifty
years earlier. Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act prohibited all coal mining that caused subsidence damage to pre-existing public buildings, dwellings and cemeteries.5 6 Instead
of deciding the case as a nuisance, the Court focused on whether the Act
had a public purpose.5" Citing to section 2 of the Subsidence Act, 8 the
Court stated that:
[u]nlike the Kohler Act
the Subsidence Act does not merely involve a balancing of the private economic interests of coal companies
against the private interests of the surface owners. The Pennsylvania
Legislature specifically found that important public interests are served
by enforcing
a policy that is designed to miimiize subsidence in certain
59
areas.

The result of cases like Penn Centraland Keystone is that the emphasis
in takings cases was not whether the regulation's purpose was to abate a
nuisance, but rather, whether the regulation was a valid exercise of the
police power.
D. Retrenchment
In his dissent in Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist argued that "[t]he
nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not cotermnnous with the
police power itself. The question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others."' Rehnquist stated that
the City of New York was not prohibiting a nuisance, but was "seeking
to preserve what they believe to be an outstanding example of beaux arts
architecture." 61 As such, the regulation of the property should not have
been covered by the nuisance exception because there was no nuisance.
Returning to the origins of this exception, Rehnquist's argument
Central is taken to its extreme, no property interest is safe from uncompensated government appropriation.
56. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476.
57. While the Court noted that the State was abating an activity "akin to a public
nuisance," the Court emphasized that the State was protecting the "public interest in
health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area." Id. at 488.
58. This act shall be deemed to be an exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the
people of the Commonwealth, by providing for the conservation of surface land
areas which may be affected in the mining of bituminous coal by methods other
than "open pit" or "strip" mining, to aid in the protection of the safety of the
public, to enhance the value of such lands for taxation, to aid in the preservation of surface water drainage and public water supplies and generally to improve the use and enjoyment of such lands and to maintain primary jurisdiction
over surface coal mining in Pennsylvania.
Id. at 485-86 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986)).
59. Id. at 485.
60. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Essentially, Rehnquist
repeats the argument made by Holmes in Mahon. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanymg text.
61. Id. at 146.
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makes sense. The exception was based on the premise that because a
nuisance action against the property owner would prevent the noxious
use of the land, the State could regulate this use before the noxious act
occurred. New York would not have been able to prevent the construction above Penn Station in the absence of the Landmark Preservation
Law. To extend the exception to all valid exercises of the police power
would be to create the exception that swallowed the rule. However, it
took ten years for the Court to move from Justice Brennan's reasoning in
Penn Central towards the reasoning of the Rehnquist dissent.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commn,6 Justice Scalia briefly addressed this issue. The Commission, relying on Penn Central, argued
that a "public access to the beach" requirement, as a condition of grantmg a building permit, was "part of a comprehensive program to provide
continuous public access along [the] . beach." 6 As such, the regulation was a police power regulation m furtherance of the public interest.
Responding, Justice Scalia writes that this argument,
is simply an expression of the Commission's belief that the public interest will be served by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach
along the coast. The Commission may well be right that it is a good
idea, but that does not establish that the Nollans
alone can be
compelled to contribute to its realization. Rather, California is free to
advance its "comprehensive program," if it wishes, by using its power
of eminent domain for this "public purpose," but if it 4wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for itf
Scalia rejects Brennan's argument. It is not enough that the regulation
is in the public's interest; it can still be a taking. The table was set for the
Lucas decision.
II.

LUCAS v.SOUTH CAROLINA

COASTAL COUNCIL

In 1986, David Lucas bought two vacant lots on the Isle of Palms, one
of the barrier islands off the coast of South Carolina. 6 The lots, numbers
62. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
63. Id. at 841.

64. Id. at 841-42 (citation omitted).
65. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. While Lucas has been portrayed as the innocent purchaser of property which was later regulated, the "classic" regulatory takings case, Lucas
actually had been involved on the Isle of Palms since 1979 as a contractor and realtor.
See John R. Nolon, High Court's Lucas Decision Leaves Shifting Sands in Regulatory

Takings Law, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1992, at 1. Thus, Lucas was aware of the changing shoreline, of the previous regulation and of the possibility that there would be further regulations. This is important because it affects the reasonable investment-backed expectations
that Lucas might have had. See infra note 78. "Those who do business in the regulated
field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to
achieve the legislative end." Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227
(1986). Since the Beachfront Management Act was an attempt to fix the shortcomings of
the original South Carolina statute, it would not be a taking because it was a "prophylactic extension of the liability initially exposed." Id. at 231 (O'Connor, J., concurng). See
infra note 68. One can also argue that because of the hazards of living in an area prone to
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22 and 24, were located in the Beachwood East Subdivision of the Wild
Dunes development.6 6 Lucas paid $975,000 for the two lots, upon which
he planned to build residential houses..6 7 In 1988, the state, in an attempt
to control the erosion that had ravaged the coastline, passed the Beachfront Management Act (BMA).6" Pursuant to the BMA, the Coastal
hurricane destruction, Lucas had no reasonable economic expectations. This statement
would certainly be true if Lucas' plots were located on top of a glacier, on top of an
earthquake fault or next to a volcano. The result is the same if the property were located
on a river floodplain or on an unstable hillside. See Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1988); Maple Leaf Investors v. State Dep't of
Ecology, 565 P.2d 1162 (Wash. 1977). By denying the right to build improvements on
Lucas' land, the State is not taking away his property, but confirming the natural limitations of beachfront property.
66. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. Lucas paid $475,000 for lot 22 and $500,000 for lot 24.
Transcript of Record on Appeal at 26-27, South Carolina Coastal Council v. Lucas, No.
88-CP-10-66 (Charleston County, August 10, 1989) [hereinafter Tr. Trans.]. At the time
of the purchase, both lots were zoned for single-family homes and a similar home was
already in existence on lot 23 (the lot between Lucas' two lots) and on other similar lots
along the beach. Id. Lucas argues, and Justice Scalia agrees, that the existence of beach
houses on the neighboring properties is an indication that this use of the land is not a
nuisance. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. However, Lucas was a member of the Wild Dunes
development company. See supra note 65. Lucas helped to create the condition that he is
now relying on. He built and marketed the houses on Wild Dunes. Given this fact, the
houses on adjacent lots prove nothing towards the suitability of the lots for residential
purposes.
67. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2889.
68. SECTION 1. The General Assembly Finds that:
(1) The beach/dune system along the coast of South Carolina is extremely important to the people of this State and serves the following functions:
(a) protects life and property by serving as a storm barrer which dissipates
wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability in an economical and effective
manner;
(b) provides the basis for a tourism industry that generates approximately
two-thirds of South Carolina's annual tourism industry revenue which constitutes a significant portion of the state's economy. The tourists who come to the
South Carolina coast to enjoy the ocean and dry sand beach contribute significantly to state and local tax revenues;
(c) provides habitat for numerous species of plants and animals, several of
which are threatened or endangered. Waters adjacent to the beach/dune system also provide habitat for many other marine species;
(d) provides a natural health environment for the citizens of South Carolina
to spend leisure time which serves their physical and mental well being.
(2) Beach/dune system vegetation is umque and extremely important to the
vitality and preservation of the system.
(3) Many miles of South Carolina's beaches have been identified as critically
eroding.
(4) Chapter 39, Title 48, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, Coastal Tidelands and Wetlands, does not provide adequate jurisdiction to the South Carolina Coastal Council to enable it to effectively protect the integrity of the beach/
dune system. Consequently, without adequate controls, development has been
unwisely sited too close to the system. This type of development has jeopardized the stability of the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and endangered adjacent property. It is in both the public and private interests to protect
the system from this unwise development.
(5) The use of armoring in the form of hard erosion control devices such as
seawalls, bulkheads, and rip-rap to protect erosion-threatened structures adjacent to the beach has not proven effective. These armoring devices have given a
false sense of security to beach front property owners. In reality, these hard
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Council established a setback line, seaward of which, no new construction could occur.6 9 Lucas was barred from building his houses because
his plots were located within the setback zone.7" Lucas brought suit
against the South Carolina Coastal Council claunming that "even though
the Act may have been a lawful exercise of the State's police power, the
ban on construction deprived hin of all economically viable use of his
property and therefore effected a taking under the71Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
structures, in many instances, have increased the vulnerability of beach front
property to damage from wind and waves while contributing to the deterioration and loss of the dry sand beach which is so important to the tourism
industry.
(6) Erosion is a natural process which becomes a significant problem for man
only when structures are erected in close proximity to the beach/dune system.
It is in both the public and private interests to afford the beach/dune system
space to accrete and erode in its natural cycle. This space can be provided only
by discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune system
and encouraging those who have erected structures too close to the system to
retreat from it.
(7) Inlet and harbor management practices, including the construction ofjetties
which have not been designed to accommodate the long shore transport of sand,
can deprive downdrift beach/dune systems of their natural sand supply.
Dredging practices which include disposal of beach quality sand at sea also can
deprive the beach/dune system of much needed sand.
(8) It is in the state's best interest to protect and to promote increased public
access to South Carolina's beaches for out-of-state tourists and South Carolina
residents alike.
(9) Present funding for the protection, management, and enhancement of the
beach/dune system is inadequate.
(10) There is no coordinated state policy for post-storm emergency management of the beach/dune system.
(11) A long-range comprehensive beach management plan is needed for the
entire coast of South Carolina to protect and effectively manage the beach/dune
system, thus preventing unwise development and minmizing man's adverse inpact on the system.
S.C. CODE § 48-39-250 (1988) quoted in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895, 896-98 (S.C. 1991).
69. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2889.
70. Id.
71. Eugene J.Moms, In 'Lucas' Opinions, Supreme Court Elaborateson 'Taking' in
Landmark Case, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 16, 1992 at S-5. One of Lucas' arguments was that there
is no nuisance exception to the takings clause at all since Mugler was decided as a due
process case and not as a takings case (the Court did not incorporate the takings clause
against the states until Chicago B.Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)) and because
Mugler antedated Justice Holmes' proclamation that regulation can go too far. See supra
note 29 and accompanying text. Thus, according to Lucas, the nuisance exception only
applies to due process claims. See Douglas W Kmiec, When Must CompensationBe Paid
Under the Takings Clause:Is Building a Beach House Really a Nuisance?, 7 A.B.A. PREVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES, Mar. 27, 1992. Kmiec objects to this
argument stating that the nuisance exception was applied to takings cases in Miller and in
GoldblatL Id. In addition, Kmiec argues that there really is no purpose in separating
"due process" claims from "due process claims incorporating the takings clause." Id. In
any event, the Supreme Court did not address this argument of Lucas, and Justice Scalia
makes it quite clear that the nuisance exception applies to takings cases and that it is the
only exception where the economic deprivation is complete. See generally, Lucas, 112 S.
Ct. at 2900-02.
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The state trial court agreed with Lucas, finding that the property had
been rendered valueless by the 1988 Act and awarded Lucas
$1,232,387.50 in damages.7 2 On appeal, the State Supreme Court noted
that "since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a
nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything
when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity ,73 The
court held that since Lucas failed to contest the legislative findings, he
conceded that the purpose of the Act was to prevent a great public
harm.74 Thus, the high court overruled the trial court, holding that the
legislation was designed to prevent a public harm and was therefore excepted from the protection of the takings clause.7 5
The Lucas case reached the Supreme Court in 1992, and relying on the
finding of the trial court that all value had been taken,7 6 the Court held
72. The trial judge found that due to the BMA, the property had no market value and
that the regulation was a "total taking of Lucas's [sic] two beach front lots." Tr. Trans.,
supra note 66, at 130. "Since the State has totally acquired Lucas' property, it is entitled
to a deed to the property free and clear of any encumbrances." Id. Thus, the judge
ordered the state to pay compensation equal to the full market-value of the lots
($585,000/lot), the real estate taxes paid after the BMA went into effect and the interest
from the mortgage. Id.
73. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899 (quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n.20).
74. Id. at 898.
75. Id. at 902.
76. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2896. Justice Scalia writes that the essential use of land is to
erect habitable or productive improvements on the land. Id. at 2901. The implication of
this statement is that if the development rights are denied, the state has effected a taking.
If this is what Justice Scalia means, he has overruled a substantial line of precedent that
holds otherwise. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (no taking
where the owner had right to evict others from the property); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704 (1987) (the right to sell and bequeath is an important property right). The Supreme
Court of South Carolina has also held that the right to sell property and the right to
exclude others from property are important rights, leaving value to land even when the
development rights are taken away. See Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 403
S.E.2d 620, 622 (S.C.) (note, however, that here only part of the property was "taken"),
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 185 (1991). Several of the dissenting justices in Lucas also wondered whether the finding that the land had no value was correct. Justice Blackmun
writes that the majority,
[r]elying on an unreviewed (and implausible) state trial court finding that this
restriction left Lucas' property valueless, this Court granted review to determine whether compensation must be paid in cases where the State prohibits all
economic use of real estate. According to the Court, such an occasion never
has arisen in any of our prior cases, and the court imagines that it will anse
'relatively rarely' or only in 'extraordinary circumstances.' Almost certainly it
did not happen in this case.
Id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). Further, he writes that Lucas "can picnic, swim,
camp in a tent, or live on the property in a movable trailer" and that state courts have
recogmzed that such uses give land economic value. Id. at 2908. See, e.g., Turnpike
Realty v. Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973);
Turner v. Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972); Hall v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 528
A.2d 453 (Me. 1987). While Justice Scalia had the opportunity to decide that the factual
findings were not substantiated by the record, he chose not to address the issue. Lucas,
112 S.Ct. at 2896 n.9. This lends credence to the author's opinion that Justice Scalia
agrees with the state trial court that property has no value when the right to develop is
taken away.
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that unless the State could show on remand that the primary purpose of
the act was to prevent a nuisance, there was a taking of Lucas'
property."
While the Court had previously applied a balancing test in all regulatory takings cases, in Lucas, the Court held that where property is rendered valueless by regulation, no balancing test is applied.7" Finally,
while the nuisance exception to the takings clause still applied, the Court
emphasized that:
to win its case South Carolina must do more than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the
public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.

79

Instead
South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the
circumstances in which the property is presently found.80
There are two interesting points to note about the holding. First, the
Court concluded that the nuisance exception applies, even where there is
77. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
78. Id. at 2900. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982), the Court held that when a statute causes a permanent physical occupation of
property, the government must compensate the property owner, no matter what public
interests are involved. However, prior to Lucas, in regulatory takings cases (where there
is no physical invasion of the property), it was well established that there were three
factors to be considered and balanced against one another. See Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). These factors are "the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations." Id. at 83. The Lucas holding seems to define another Fifth
Amendment category, where the property has been rendered valueless. Scalia labels this
category as "confiscatory regulations." His reasoning is "that the total deprivation of
beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (citations omitted). Scalia also cites to three Supreme
Court decisions: Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virgima Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981). One
commentator, Donald Ayer, points out that Justice Scalia's assertion is not as well
founded in law as his words indicate. Donald B. Ayer, StrayingFrom the Right Religion,
THE RECORDER, Aug. 13, 1992, at 8. The Nollan and Keystone cites are only dicta, and
while Hodel states that where all value is not taken, there is no regulatory taking, "it does
not follow that the inverse is also true - that a regulatory taking necessarily occurs where
all value is taken." Id. Ayer writes that the balancing approach is the anathema to Justice Scalia's belief that the law is a "set of rules applicable with substantial certainty and
predictability." Id. Ayer cites Scalia's dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
where Scalia criticizes the Court's balancing test for substituting for a legal rule "the
unfettered wisdom of a majority of this court, revealed to an obedient people on a caseby-case basis." While to preserve the certainty of law is a noble pursuit, Ayer questions
what he sees in Lucas as "judicial creativity and rewriting of precedent" to further this
goal. Id. Ayer concludes that even a "restrained group of strict constructionists [are] not
beyond building a constitutional sand castle now and then, even as they assail others for
shoring up a similar edifice whose foundation and architecture they abhor." Id.
79. One should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
80. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02 (citations omitted).
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a complete deprivation of the economic value of the property 81 It is
surprising that Justice Scalia would hold this way, given the Rehnquist
dissent in Keystone to which Justice Scalia joined. Justice Rehnquist
noted in Keystone that "our cases have never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete extinction of the value of a parcel of property.
[W]e have not accepted the proposition that the State may completely
extinguish a property interest or prohibit all use without providing compensation." 2 But this part of the Lucas holding makes sense. If the
state or a neighbor prevails in a nuisance action against the property
owner, the owner could be enjoined from all use of his property Simlarly, the state, to prevent a nuisance, should be able to regulate all use of
property
The second and more controversial feature of the holding is that it
overrules Miller and the other cases where the legislature had declared
that certain uses of property were nuisances. Justice Scalia, in describing
these confiscatory regulations, writes that "[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." 3 The "legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot
be the basis for departing from [the] categorical rule that total regulatory
takings must be compensated." 4 At least one commentator believes
that this holding is problematic because it assumes that nuisance and
property law are fixed for eternity 85 However, like the beaches of South
Carolina itself, nuisance is constantly being redefined. Lottery tickets
were once considered noxious goods, 6 and in Mugler, the production of
alcoholic beverages was considered a nuisance. Today, the production
of neither good is considered a nuisance. As Donald Ayer points out,
"[u]nless Justice Scalia intends to freeze nuisance and property law absolutely at some point in history or, for each party, at the time he buys his
land - two unimaginable thoughts
takings claims will continue to
involve difficult and subjective judgments about appropriate uses of prop81. As previously noted, the Court never had to address a case where all economic
value had been taken away. See supra notes 26-27, 35, 42, 47 and accompanying text.
82. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513. But see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 313 (1987) ("[W]e
have no occasion to decide
whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the dental of all use was insulated as a part of the State's
authority to enact safety regulations") (emphasis added).
83. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. The text seems to indicate that the common law requirement applies only to cases where the economic use of the land is totally deprived.
"Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated." Id. If this is the holding, there is
room to argue that in cases where the deprivation is not complete, the legislature's determination that the use is a nuisance may be sufficient to not require compensation.
84. Id. at 2899.
85. Ayer, supra note 78.
86. See The Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
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erty." s7 Despite these criticisms, state courts must now address the issue
of whether the common law definitions of nuisance and property are
broad enough to protect a regulation from being a taking."s
III.

A.

SOUTH CAROLINA COMMON LAW NUISANCE

Nuisance Per Accidens: The Inappropriatenessof Building
on the Beach

In Lucas, Justice Scalia wrote that "[ilt seems unlikely that commonlaw principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's land; they rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land."8 9 Similar expressions of this statement
can be found in the dissents of several South Carolina cases regarding
whether beachfront houses are nisances. In Esposito v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,9 0 Judge Hall wrote that "the rapidity with winch rental
beach houses are gobbled up by the public causes me to doubt that they
are, at least yet, generally regarded as 'tantamount to a public nisance.' "91 Citing Mugler, Hadacheck,Miller and Goldblatt,Judge Hall
concluded that "living in a beach bungalow bears little resemblance to
the noxious uses of property the Supreme Court has identified." 92 Property that sells for a half of a million dollars cannot be a nuisance. But is
this view correct? 93 The manufacture of bricks, the growing of cedar
87. Ayer, supra note 78. One should question whether it is wise to limit land use
regulation to the codification of the common law.
88. See Bernardsville Quarry v. Bernardsville Borough, 129 N.J. 221 (1992) (landowner did not satisfy Lucas standard because regulations fell short of depriving all econonically beneficial use). In Vermont, a couple is m federal court claiming that the
government should pay them for its control of 400 feet of their land adjacent to a bike
path on Lake Champlain. See Ellyn Ferguson, Burlington Couple Loses Round in Bike
PathFight, GANNET NEws SERVICE, Nov. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File. The "Lucas Case places heavy emphasis on the date of acquisition m determining if government action deprives a land owner of 'all economically viable use of his
property.'" Id. In Kentucky, the D & N Coal Company recently filed suit in Franklin
Circuit Court, claiming that the state's determination that 3,000 acres were unsuitable for
coal mining amounts to a taking of the company's property. "[T]he Lucas case helped set
the stage for the suit." PropertyRights: KY Case Follows in Lucas' Wake, AMERICAN
POLITICAL NETwoRK INC. GREENWIRE, Oct. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
89. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
90. 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027
(1992).
91. Esposito, 939 F.2d. at 173 n.2.
92. Id.
93. The reasoning behind the market value theory is that the "market is supremely
[P]eople who know of hazards will consider them in
rational in weighing dangers.
"See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The
amving at purchase prices and development decisions.
Takings Issue in a NaturalSetting: Floodlines and the PolicePower, 52 TEX. L. REV 201,
208 (1974). Thus, the market value is a good indication of whether the property is a
nuisance or not. However, m certain real estate markets, a high market value may have
no relevance in determining whether a property is a nuisance or not. Id. The "floodplain
land market can only reflect the aggregate wisdom of the least discriminating class of
buyers. Market values are set by the highest prices that are being offered consistently for
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trees and the mining of gravel were not nuisances per se. They were
nuisances because of where they were located. 94 Even a bible camp is a
nuisance if it is built in an inappropriate location. This was the result in
FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles.9 5 In FirstEnglish, a church purchased a twenty-one acre campground known as Lutherglen.9 6 Twelve of these acres were on the floodplain of Mill Creek. 97 In 1977, approximately 3,860 acres of the
floodplain area were burned in a fire, causing a potential flood hazard.9"
In 1978, as a result of eleven inches of rainfall in the watershed area, Mill
Creek overflowed, destroying the buildings on the banks.9 9 Ten people
drowned and millions of dollars of property were destroyed.i" ° Further
losses were prevented only because Lutherglen's planned camp for handisimilar floodplain parcels; presumably persons who ignore the flood hazard offer the
highest prices." Id. "Alternatively, buyers who know about the flood hazard can ignore
it for other reasons, because public subsidies or weaknesses in tort remedies allow them to
externalize costs caused on and off the site." Id. at 208 n.20.
94. As Justice Scalia states, the owner of a nuclear power plant is not entitled to
compensation "when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
95. 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (2d App. Div. 1989) [hereinafter FirstEnglish II], cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1056 (1990). This case had already reached the Supreme Court on the issue of
whether "temporary takings" were compensable. First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) [hereinafter First English I].
However, the Court did not address the issue of whether the ordinance was enacted as a
safety regulation which would "avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred.
"Id. at 313. In some ways tis case resembles Lucas. The regulation in both
cases deprived the owners of the right to build. Both Califorma and South Carolina
argued that the regulation was enacted for safety purposes. The difference is that in First
English I, the Court was ruling on one issue: temporary takings. Justice Stevens, m his
dissenting opimon, restated the importance of this limited holding. "No matter whether
the regulation is treated as one that deprives appellant of its property on a permanent or
temporary basis, this Court's precedents demonstrate that the type of regulatory program
at issue here cannot constitute a taking." Id. at 325. The California court was deciding
the state's safety argument with no negative guidance from the Supreme Court. However, in Lucas, Justice Scalia told the South Carolina court that he felt it unlikely that the
BMA would be covered by background nuisance principles. "We stress that an affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be defended only if an objectively reasonableapplication of relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial uses in
the circumstances in which the land is presently found." Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2902 n.18.
FirstEnglish II and Lucas on remand may have been decided differently because of the
different guidance received by the state courts.
96. FirstEnglish II, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
97. Id.
98. Id at 895.
The vegetation of a watershed area normally protects against flooding because
the vegetation slows the flow of water, which can then percolate into the soil or
be carried away by streams. When the vegetation is burned, however, there is
no slowing of the flow, and the crust on the ground formed by the fire's intense
heat prevents percolation of water into the soil. Additionally, the ash and debris from the fire increase the bulk of the flow, known as the bulking factor,
which increases the erosion damage caused by the runoff.
Id. at 895 n.l.
99. Id. at 895.

100. Id.
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capped children scheduled for that week had been canceled.10 1
In response to tins flood, the County of Los Angeles adopted an interun ordinance prohibiting the construction or reconstruction of any
building in an interim flood protection area, which included Lutherglen. 10 2 Shortly after, the church started an inverse condemnation action
all use of Lutherglen was denied as a result of the
claiming that
03
ordinance. 1
Citing Mugler, the California court denied the church relief, holding
that "[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or
an appropriation of property for the public benefit."' 4 The court recognized that the use of the property here was not traditionally viewed as a
nuisance but because of its location, its use had to be regulated. "[A]
brewery is a far cry from a Bible camp. But here the threat to public
health and safety emanates not from what is produced on the property
but from the presence of any substantial structures on that property "105
Finally, the court concluded that "it would be extraordinary to construe
the Constitution to require a government to compensate private landowners because it denied them 'the right' to use property which cannot
be used without risking injury and death."' 0 6 The reasoning employed in
FirstEnglish, is easily applicable to Lucas. As recent storms have shown,
building on the beach is equally dangerous to building on a floodplam or
at the base of a volcano. As a safety precaution, tis construction can be
prohibited by the state."0 7
In 1972, Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act, l08 creating a partnership between the states and the federal government in order to manage the coastal zone. Section 1452(2)(B) of the Act states that
programs should be designed to
nmmize the loss of life and property caused by improper development
in flood-prone, storm surge, geological hazard, and erosion-prone areas
and in areas likely to be affected by or vulnerable to sea level rise, land
subsidence, and saltwater intrusion, and by the destruction of natural
protective features such as beaches, dunes, wetlands, and bamer
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 899.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 901. The court goes on to say that where there is no use of the property
that does not threaten life and health, the government should be able to deny the property
owner all uses of his property. Id. at 902.
107. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that when a building is unfit for
its use and it is a "source of danger to the community," the legislature can "require that
its use for a purpose which injures the public be discontinued. "Richards v. Columbia,
88 S.E.2d 683, 689 (S.C. 1955) (quoting Adamee v. Post, 7 N.E.2d 120, 124 (N.Y. 1937)).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1992).
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In 1982, Congress made further attempts to discourage landowners
from building on the beach by enacting the Coastal Barrier Resources
Act.110 The Act stated that "[c]oastal barriers serve as natural storm
protective buffers and are generally unsuitablefor development because
they are vulnerable to hurricane and other storm damage and because
natural shoreline recession and the movement of unstable sediments undermine manmade structures."11' 1
The Isle of Palms, where Lucas' property is situated, is a coastal barrier island subject to intense storms.1 12 The most effective protection
against the intense wind and wave action is the dunes.' 13 During a
storm, the dunes create a "reservoir of beach sand" that helps prevent
the damages caused by flood and wave damage to beachfront property.1 14
In 1989, Hurricane Hugo passed over the coastline of South Carolina.
Upon reviewing the damage, it was noted that the structures that lay
behind substantial dunes received far less damage than those that were
exposed to the wind and the waves.' 15 Two dunes on Litchfield Beach
(north of the Isle of Palms), twenty feet tall, more than eighty feet wide
and two miles long, withstood the tidal surge and protected the property
behind it.116 However, "[j]ust down the beach to the south, the first floor
of the Litchfield Inn, a motel that lay behind a less substantial dune, was
wrecked by the storm surge. And on Pawleys Island, about forty homes
were destroyed on the island's southern tip where there were no
dunes."

117

At the Lucas trial, Christopher Jones, an expert in shorefront management, testified that for two reasons, certain types of construction cause
erosion on the beaches: (1) "they prevent the uplands from eroding and
naturally supplying nourishment to the beach;" and (2) "they can accel109. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2)(B).
110. 16 U.S.C. § 3501 (1992).
111. 16 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(3) (emphasis added).
112. On January 1, 1987, a storm hit the coast of South Carolina and eroded between
twenty and fifty feet of certain beaches. See Tr. Trans., supra note 66, at 64. According to
Christopher Jones, who gave expert testimony at trial for the Coastal Council, the areas
that sustained the most damages were where the construction was near the shoreline.
Examples given were Garden City, Hilton Head, Folly Beach and the east end of the Isle
of Palms (the Wild Dunes area where Lucas' property is located). Id. However, the
storm that has gained the most attention in South Carolina was Hurricane Hugo that hit
South Carolina while this litigation was pending.
113. "Natural sand dunes are formed by winds blowing onshore over the beach, transporting sand landward. Grass and sometimes bushes grow on sand dunes, creating a
natural barrier against sea attack."
COASTAL EROSION 61 (1990).

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING

114. Id.
115. Keith Schneider, South Carolina Begins Rebuilding Storm-Swept Beach Dunes,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1989, at B14.

116. Id.
117. Id.
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erate erosion around the ends of those structures."' The types of structures to which Jones alluded, were those that extend perpendicular to the
shoreline (jetties and groms), erosion control structures (abutments and
seawalls) and given certain conditions, habitable structures. 119 To continue to allow building on the beach would erode the dunes and threaten
the property of those who rely on the dunes to protect their property
from storms.
In Commonwealth v. Alger,120 the court held that "when land is so
situated, or such is its conformation, that it forms a natural barrier to
rivers or tidal watercourses, the owner cannot justifiably remove it, to
such an extent as to... destroy the valuable rights of other proprietors
... in the contiguous lands."''
Building on the beach inevitably causes
erosion, the destruction of the neighboring beaches, and courts, following
the reasoning of Alger, should find that such construction is a nuisance.
In Lummis v. Lilly,'2 2 the court held that the construction of erosion
barriers could be the cause of a nuisance action brought by a neighboring
landowner. In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the construction of a
groin, on the beach updrift of his property, was causing his property to
erode.123 A groin iterrupts the "littoral drifting of sand along the shore,
thereby producing deposition of sand on the updrift side of the structure
and widening the beach."' 2 4 However, the "drifting continues on the
downdrift side of the structure and since the sand which is transported
away is not replaced by sand from the updrift side, the beach narrows on
the downdrift side of the groin."' 1 25 Citing Alger, the court held that this
was a proper nuisance action and dismissed the defendant's summary
judgment motion.' 26 Lucas' construction will cause the beaches to erode
in the same way that the groin i Lummis caused the neighboring beach
to erode. The construction is therefore a nuisance, and South Carolina,
through the BMA, can prohibit the construction without having to compensate Lucas.
Building on the beach presents an additional problem besides the erosion of the dunes. When storms hit the beachfront communities, the
wind and waves send pieces of one house crashing into another, causing
considerable damage. Hurricane Hugo, with its 136 m.p.h. winds, did
extensive damage to the Isle of Palms. "Majestic palm trees were broken
in half like toothpicks and steel I-beams were twisted into pretzels and
strewn across construction sites. Homeowners returned after Hugo had
marched onward, only to find their houses leveled, severely damaged or
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Tr. Trans., supra note 66, at 68.
Id. at 67-68.
61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
Id. at 86-87.
429 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass. 1982).
Id. at 1147-48.
Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
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moved several hundred yards from where they once stood." 12' 7
Older buildings with slab floors were devastated when the slabs were
undermined, broken and lifted up to batter the ground level. Peripheral structures, such as decks, walkways and swimming pools, and
sometimes even entire homes, became battering rams, knocking down
other houses
[F]irst-row beach
were transported back
12 8 homes
into the fourth row of buildings.
The potential damage to the islands is not over once the hurricane has
passed. In what is known as "reverse damage," the flood water washes
back towards the coast. If the water cannot pass through the inlets, the
barrier islands are flooded once again from the bay side. 129 Cinder block
homes fare the worst in storm situations, and while brick and wood
homes can be reinforced,
the extremely high costs prohibit most home1 30
owners from doing so.
In Spiegle v. Borough of Beach Haven,13 1 a New Jersey case similar to
Lucas, the court held that a "fence ordinance" and a "dune ordinance"
did not constitute a taking of the property even though they prevented
certain construction on the beach. 132 There was no taking of the property because the Borough of Beach Haven proved that building on the
beach was a serious safety hazard. "[T]o construct houses oceanward of
the building line" would be unsafe because of the possibility that the
houses would be destroyed during a severe storm. 33 The Borough also
offered proof of peril to life and health "arising through the likely destruction of streets, sewer, water and gas mains, and electric power lines
in the proscribed area in an ordinary storm., 13 4 The Borough's descnption of potential damage seems incredibly prophetic when viewing the
destruction on the Isle of Palms caused by Hurricane Hugo.
[RIesidents of [the Isle of Palms] wondered what would happen if a
powerful hurricane struck at high tide.
Today the answer greeted hundreds of them as they
discovered
their homes ripped apart, sand dunes washed away, streets blocked by
shattered pine
trees, downed electric wires, crushed automobiles and
135
other debris.
127. Hugo Huffed and He Puffed Butler Building Survives, PR NEwswIRE, Dec. 1,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omm File.
128. Fred Wolff and Nicholas C. Coch, It Could Happen Here; A Hurrcane with
Hugo's Clout Would Wreak Destructionfrom the Hamptons to Canarsie, NEWSDAY, Oct.
15, 1989, at 1 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. Robert P Hey, Building on Sand Seems a Pitfall, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct.
16, 1989, at 8.
131. 218 A.2d 129 (N.J.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966).
132. Spiegle, 218 A.2d at 137.
133. Id. (Such storm damage had occurred in 1962).
134. Id.
135. Keith Schneider, CarolinaIsles After Storm: Salvaging the Shattered Past, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 29, 1989, at A14.
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In FirstEnglish, it was a nuisance to build on the floodplain because of
the potential loss of life and property resulting from heavy rams. Justice
Stevens noted that "in light of the tragic flood and the loss of life that
precipitated the safety regulation here, it is hard'' 1to
understand how ap36
pellant ever expected to rebuild on Lutherglen.
In light of the destruction caused by Hurricane Hugo (to which the
flooding of Lutherglen seems mild in comparison), it is difficult to understand how Justice Scalia failed to see that beachfront management is necessary to avoid catastrophe. It is a nuisance to build on the beach
because of the potential loss of life and property resulting from humcanes and other severe storms.
B.

Nuisance and the Public Trust

At Roman Law, "these things are common to mankind - the air, runmng water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one
therefore is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects
habitations, monuments and buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law of nations." 13 7 No one was forbidden access to the
sea and everyone could use the seashore "to dry his nets there, and haul
them from the sea." ' 8 Tins common law right of the public to use the
seashore still remains a "guiding principle in all or nearly all jurisdictions
which acknowledge the common law and unless changed by code or statute, in all civil law jurisdictions as well." 13' 9 The interference with this
public right is a nuisance and if the adjacent property owner's use of his
land interferes with tins right, the state can enjoin this use or regulate
this use prospectively.
1. The Public Trust Doctrine as Applied m England, the United
States and South Carolina
In England, this common law principle manifested itself in a rule of
construction regarding the King's manorial grant of coastal lands.
Although the King could grant rights in the tidelands, 14° a grant of the
highland adjacent to the tidelands would not carry with it any rights to
the tidelands unless the grant specifically stated the rights to the tide136. FirstEnglish I, 482 U.S. at 327-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. J. Inst., 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 1st Am. ed. 1876), quoted in State v. Balli, 190
S.W.2d 71, 100 (Tex. 1944).
138. J. Inst. 2.1.5. (T. Sandars, trans., ist Am. ed. 1876), quoted in Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Assn., 471 A.2d 355, 360 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
139. Balli, 190 S.W.2d at 100.
140. For the purposes of this discussion, the term "tidelands" refers to the land between the high tide and low tide mark that is covered at one point during the day by
water. The term "submerged lands" refers to the land that is constantly covered by water
and which forms the bed of the river. "Tidal streams" are streams and rivers that are
subject to the ebb and flow of the sea.
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lands. 141 However, a grant of land adjacent to non-tidal waters "automatically carried with it title to the land beneath those waters, unless the
grant specifically excluded that land."142 Thus, in streams that were not
subject to the sea's tides, the title of riparians extended to the center of
the streams. 14 3 Two commentators try to explain the difference between
tidal and non-tidal riparian grants based on the geography of England
and on the structure of life therein. England, as an island, was "largely
dependant on a sea-related economy rather than a self-sustaining continent." 1 " Further, as noted by Justice Field in The Daniel Ball, 4 5 in
England there are no navigable waters "in fact, or at least to any considerable extent, which are not subject to the tide, and from this circumstance tide water and navigable water there signify substantially the same
thing.' 146 However, in countries like France, Spain and Mexico that had
reached greater levels of self-sufficiency because of more extensive resources (and where there were many rivers not subject to the tide), the
distinction was not between tidal and non-tidal water, but between navigable and non-navigable waters. Where the river was navigable, the land
grants did not include the rights to the land between the tides." 7
After the Magna Carta, this rule changed from a rule of construction
to a firm rule granting certain rights to the public. Tidelands became a
separate form of property, held in trust for the people by the King and
incapable of being transferred to a private person. 148 Only Parliament, as
the representative of the English people (the recipients of the lands in
trust), had the power to grant these lands to private persons.' 49
When the first American states became sovereign after the revolution,
their governments acceded to the King's rights with respect to water
within their borders. 15 0 Under the "Equal Footing Doctrine," new
states, upon entry to the Union, received ownership of all lands under
water subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.' 5 '
In 1852, the Supreme Court, in The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh,152 recognized that the English rule did not make much sense in the
United States. While in England, most of the rivers were subject to the
141. William A. Clineburg & John E. Krahmer, The Law Pertainingto Estuarine
Lands in South Carolina, 23 S.C. L. REv 7, 11 (1971).
142. Id.
143. Balli, 190 S.W.2d at 111 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
144. Clineburg & Krahmer, supra note 141, at 11. The tidelands were protected so
that the English public would always have access to the sea for fishing and shipping, two
important island industries.
145. 77 U.S. (10 Wail.) 557 (1870).
146. Id. at 563.
147. Balli, 190 S.W.2d at III (Sharp, J., dissenting).
148. Clineburg & Krahmer, supra note 141, at 11-12. While the change occurred after
the Magna Carta, it was not necessarily because of the Magna Carta. Id. at 11, n. 14.
149. Id. at 12.
150. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988).
151. Id.
152. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
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ebb of flow of the sea, the geography of America was quite different. The
"thousands of miles of public navigable water[s]
m which there is no
tide" required that "jurisdiction [be] made to depend upon the navigable
15 3
character of the water, and not upon the ebb and flow of the tide."
The rule in the United States thus became more like that m France and
Spain rather than that in England, relying on whether the river was navigable rather then on whether the river was tidal. The Supreme Court
then extended the scope of lands held in the public trust in Phillips. The
Court held that the change from "tidal-determinable" to "navigable-determinable" did not "simultaneously withdraw from public trust coverage those lands which had been consistently recognized . as being
within that doctrine's scope: all lands beneath waters influenced by the
ebb and flow of the tide." 154 As a result of Genessee and Phillips, the
federal public trust doctrine in the United State is very broad.
The Court has stated that it is a well recognized rule that individual
states have the authority to define the limits of the land that they hold in
the public trust."5 ' In 1712, the General Assembly of South Carolina
enacted a reception statute expressly declaring the common law of England to be the law of South Carolina" 6 :
all and every part of the Common Law of England, where the same is
not
inconsistent with the particular constitutions, customs and
laws of this Province
is hereby made and declared to be in as full
force and virtue within this Province,157as the same is or ought to be
within the said Kingdom of England.
Thus, as of 1712, the rule in South Carolina was that grants of riparian
land adjacent to tidal water did not grant title to the tidal land.
While the Supreme Court was broadening the public trust doctrine to
include more waterways, South Carolina did not follow the Court's lead.
The two leading South Carolina cases are State v. Pacific Guano 158 and
Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-CarolinaCanning
Co. 159 Pursuant to these two cases, title to land below the mean high tide
line on navigable tidalstreams belongs to the state to hold in trust for the
153. Id. at 457.
154. Phillips, 484 U.S. at 479-80 (citation omitted).
155. Id. at 475. The most famous example of a state limiting its public trust is the rule
in Massachusetts. "In the 1640's, in order to encourage littoral owners to build wharves,
the colonial authorities
extend[ed] private titles to
[the] mean low water line or
100 rods from the mean high water line, whichever was the lesser measure." Opinion of
the Justices to the House of Representatives, 313 N.E.2d 561, 565 (Mass. 1974). For a
thorough discussion of the public trust doctrine in the thirteen original states, see Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
156. See State ex rel. McLeod v. Sloan Constr. Co., 328 S.E.2d 84, 86 (S.C. Ct. App.
1985). See also O'Hagan v. Fraternal Aid Union, 141 S.E. 893 (S.C. 1928) (presuming
that English Common Law governs if no South Carolina authority to the contrary).
157. 2 STAT. AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 401, 413-14 (Cooper ed. 1837), quoted
in Sloan, 328 S.E.2d at 86.
158. 22 S.C. 50 (1884).
159. 146 S.E. 434 (S.C. 1928).
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public.
On its face, the rule in South Carolina is more strict than the
English rule and substantially more strict than the American rule as expressed mnPhillipsPetroleum. 6 ' The English rule does not require that
the stream be navigable, only tidal, and the American rule requires that
the stream be either navigable or tidal. However, because South Carolina's definition of navigability is so broad, the navigable requirement in
162
generally satisfied.

South Carolina also protects its non-tidal navigable rivers through its
160. In a separate concurring opinion in State v. Hardee, 193 S.E.2d 497 (S.C. 1972),
Justice Bussey writes that there is no public trust to the tidelands, only to the submerged
lands. He argues that Pacific Guano is a case about submerged lands and the statements
in Cape Romain are dicta. Id at 503-04 (Bussey, J., concumng). Historically, he argues,
tidelands were treated as vacant lands. "Indeed, it is an historical fact that the economic
welfare of the State throughout much of its history was largely dependent upon the cultivation of nce lands which were lawfully granted, privately owned tidelands." Id. at 504.
He also cites to a case, State v. South Carolina Phosphate Company Ltd., alias The Oak
Point Mines (printed in the appendix to 22 S.C. at 593). Id. At issue in Oak Point Mines
was the title to tidelands and the court concluded that "lands below high water mark in
tidal navigable rivers have been uniformly recognized by the legislature as embraced
within the description of vacant lands, and subject as such to location and grant under
the general regulations of the land office." Id. at 505. The opinion of the Hardee court,
however, seems to reject Judge Bussey's contention, adhering to the rule in Cape Romain
that land between the tides on tidal navigable streams is held in trust for public purposes.
The majority's interpretation of the public trust is affirmed in Hobbonny Club, Inc. v.
McEachern, 252 S.E.2d 133 (S.C. 1979), where the court states that "lands lying between
the usual high water line and the usual low water line on tidal navigable watercourses
enjoy a special or unique status, being held by the State in trust for public purposes." Id.
at 135.
161. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. The state of South Carolina has
argued that the rule of England should not apply to the state because the conditions of
the state (many non-tidal rivers) do not lend themselves to such a rule. See Sloan, 328
S.E.2d at 87. However, the Sloan court held that despite these conditions, South Carolina never changed the law with respect to the tidal requirement. Id.
162. In State ex rel. Medlock v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 346 S.E.2d 716 (S.C.
1986), the court sets out the rule for determining the navigability of a river:
The true test to be applied is whether a stream inherently and by its nature has
the capacity for valuable floatage, irrespective of the fact of actual use or the
extent of such use. Valuable floatage is not necessarily commercial floatage.
[There is] a tendency of modem judicial thought that water is navigable which
is of such character as to be of general use by the public for pleasure boating.
Id. at 719 (citation omitted). The federal rule is that for waters to be navigable "they
must connect with other water highways so as to subject them to the laws of interstate
commerce." Id. In Hughes v. Nelson, 399 S.E.2d 24 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990), the South
Carolina Court of Appeals described navigable waters in a "lighter" fashion: "[t]o be
navigable, a waterway does not have to embrace commercial shipping lanes. It need not
accommodate the Carnival Cruise Lines or be able to float the Love Boat." Id. at 25. The
court then states:
[I]t would, indeed, be difficult to imagine a more valuable floatage than a fishing
boat on the Edisto River. The deathless prose of Herbert Hoover leaps to mind:
The blessings of fishing include
discipline in the equality of men, meekness
and inspiration before the works of nature, charity and patience toward tackle
makers and the fish, a mockery of profits and conceits, a quieting of hate
and gladness that you do not have to decide a blanked thing until next week.
Id. at 25-26 (quoting HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE
CABINET AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1920-1933 158 (1952)).
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navigational servitude. Article XIV, Section 4, of the South Carolina
Constitution provides m part that "all navigable waters shall forever remain public highways free to the citizens of the State... and no
wharf [shall be] erected on the shores or m or over the waters of any
navigable stream unless the same be authorized by the General
Assembly "163
To restate the rule in South Carolina, lands lying between the mean
high water line and the mean low water line on navigable watercourses
are held by the state in trust for public purposes. Applying the public
trust doctrine to the facts in Lucas, the state has an interest in the
beaches of the Isle of Palms. The Isle of Palms is next to tidal navigable
waters. Lucas' property is adjacent to public trust land.
2.

The Uses of Land Held m the Public Trust and Its Effect on
Adjacent Landowners

Lucas' property is not public trust land. As the trial transcript indicates, Lucas' property is three hundred and forty feet landward of the
mean high water mark. 164 But what are the purposes for which the public trust land is held? And if these purposes would be harmed by Lucas'
use, can the state regulate Lucas' land as well?
There are two important cases that demonstrate how other states have
defined the scope of the public trust. The first is a New Jersey case, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n.16 5 The second is Marks v.
Whitney, 166 a California case. In Matthews, the court writes that while
historically the rights under the public trust were to use the ocean and
the land for navigation and fishing, the New Jersey courts have extended
uses including bathing, swimming and other
these rights "to recreational
' 167
activities."
shore
The nature of these activities requires that the public trust be extended
to cover the adjoining privately owned land. The "[e]xercise of the public's right to swim and bathe below the mean high water mark may depend upon a right to pass across the upland beach."' 16 In addition:
[t]he bather's right in the upland sands is not limited to passage. Reasonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the sea cannot be realized unless some enjoyment of the dry sand area is also allowed. The complete
163. While the navigational servitude protects the right of the public to use the nontidal river, the land adjacent to the river would still be in private hands, as opposed to the
land adjacent to a tidal river, which would also be held in the public trust. Thus, the
public trust protections are greater than those given by the navigational servitude.
164. Tr. Trans., supra note 66, at 17.
165. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
166. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
167. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363 (citing Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47
(N.J. 1972)).
168. Id. at 364. However, "[t]hfis does not mean the public has an unrestricted right to
cross at will over any and all property bordering on the common property. The public
interest is satisfied so long as there is reasonable access to the sea." Id.
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pleasure of swimming must be accompanied by
169 intermittent periods of
rest and relaxation beyond the water's edge.

In Marks, there is a greater extension to the uses of land held in the
public trust. The court notes that the public trust traditionally covers
navigation, commerce and fisheries and that it has been extended "to
include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, [and] to use for boating and
general recreation purposes.
,,170 However,
[t]he public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible
to encompass changing public needs. In admimstering the trust the
state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one
mode of utilization over another. There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands - a
use encompassed within the tidelands trust - is the preservation of
those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological
units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and marine
life, and wlch favorably
17 1
affect the scenery and climate of the area.
While the court did not address how using the public trust land as
protected tidelands would affect the public's rights to the land adjacent
to the tidelands, one can imagine that similar to the reasomng in Matthews, some use of the adjacent private land would be required in order
to gain the full enjoyment of the land held in trust. Marks and Matthews
stand for the premise that the public trust allows states to use trust land
for many purposes and that these purposes may give the public certain
rights to the adjacent private property.
South Carolina never states the purposes for which land held in trust
can be used. However, while the Beachfront Management Act does not
specifically mention the public trust, it can be read as defining the scope
and purposes of the land held m trust. It lists certain public uses of the
tidelands (recreation and conservation) and then describes how the preservation of the beach/dune system is necessary to protect these public
uses.17 2 Applying Matthews and Marks to South Carolina, South Caro169. Id. at 365. Gilbert Finnel writes that the Matthews court's rationale in expanding
the public's rights to the dry sand beach is similar to the rationale behind the easement of
necessity. "When an estate is land locked, its value is dimimshed and its use inhibited
unless there is an easement for ingress and egress implied in the conveyance." Gilbert L.
Finnel, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial Theories and the Taking
Issue, 67 N.C. L. Rlv. 627, 645 n.147 (1989).
170. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380.
171. Id. (citation omitted). See also Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis.
1972). In Just, the court states as reason for needing to protect the wetlands, the "active
public trust duty of the state of Wisconsin m respect to navigable waters [which] requires
the state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and preserve those waters for
fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty." Id. at 768.
172. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(1)(c)-(d) (Law. Co-op 1992). The code specifically states that the tidelands and the adjacent dry beach are the homes of many endangered species and that these lands provide a place for the citizens of the state to spend
their leisure time. Id.
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lina may have rights to the private beach land (including Lucas' property) in order to protect the public's rights to the tidelands. The question
now is what happens when someone interferes with these rights.
3.

It is a Nuisance to Interfere With the Public's Use
of Land Held m Trust

In Cape Romain, the court stated that "[t]he title to land below highwater mark on tidal navigable streams, under the well-settled rule, is m
the state, not for the purpose of sale, but to be held in trust for public
purposes."'1 7 3 The question arose as to whether the land held in public
trust could ever be sold to private interests. While the State Attorney
General expressed the view that this passage "precludes [the] sale of tidelands except by an act of the legislature,"1 7 4 Clineburg and Krahmer understand this passage not to mean that this land can never be sold, but
that title grants, which may include tidelands, are to be strictly construed
against the grantee.17 5 Support for this position comes from the 1950
decision, Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public Serv. Authority. 1 76 In Rice Hope, the court cited to Cape Romain, but then stated that
"we do not deem it necessary or proper upon this appeal to determine
under what circumstances and by what method, if any, title might be
"177 In Hardee, the court supported the
acquired by private owners.
i7
position stated by Clineburg and Krahmer. 1
While South Carolina allows the sale of land held in the public trust
under certain conditions, 1 79 South Carolina has always recognized that
the unauthorized obstruction of navigable waters is unlawful. "° In State
81
the court deterex rel Medlock v. South Carolina Coastal Council,1
mined that the Coastal Council's permit to allow filling of land that was
partly under the high water mark and the majority of which was regularly flooded by normal tide action was illegal because it would destroy
land that was held under the public trust. "The Coastal Council does not
have the authority to authorize the complete blockage of navigable

streams and waterways.

...

173. Cape Romain, 146 S.E. at 438.
174. Hardee, 193 S.E.2d at 500.
175. Clineburg & Krahmer, supra note 141, at 22.
176. 59 S.E.2d 132 (S.C. 1950), overruledon othergrounds, 329 S.E.2d 741 (S.C. 1985).
177. Id. at 145 (citing Cape Romain, 146 S.E. at 438).
178. Hardee, 193 S.E.2d at 500.
179. This author has not found a South Carolina case allowing the sale of land held in
the public trust. The reported cases m South Carolina, where ownership of the tidelands
is an issue, all involve an action by the state to quiet the title of someone claiming ownership to the tidelands under a grant from the English sovereign. See Hobbonny Club, Inc.
v. McEachern, 252 S.E.2d 133 (S.C. 1979); State v. Holsten Land Co., 248 S.E.2d 922
(S.C. 1978); State v. Fain, 259 S.E.2d 606 (S.C. 1979); State ex rel. McLeod v. Sloan
Const. Co., 328 S.E.2d 84 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
180. See Hughes, 399 S.E.2d at 25.
181. 346 S.E.2d 716 (S.C. 1986).
182. Id. at 719. While this case is cited as being brought by the state of South Caro-
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This protection of land held m the public trust is also found in Carter
v. South Carolina Coastal Council.18 3 In Carter, the court held that184a
regulation denying the filling of a coastal wetland was not a taking.
While the Carter court does not state that this property was protected
under the public trust, the court makes reference to the public trust doctrine in a footnote: "[a] private wetland does not have to be under the
navigable water of the state or below mean high tide . as long as it
borders on tidal water, is subject to some tidal action, and supports
aquatic growth." 18 5 If the wetland meets these requirements it can be
regulated the same as land held under the public trust.
The Carter court also cites to a Wisconsin case, Just v. Marinette
County,"8 6 which held that the destruction of public trust land is a nuisance and can therefore be regulated and enjoined. This is not a novel
theory This is a traditional common law action with origins found m
the dissent of Judge Best in the English Case, Blundell v. Catterall. s7
Judge Best held that the seashore's only purpose was as a boundary and
as an approach to the sea and therefore it should be common to all those
who wanted to use the sea. 188 Further, he argued, the interference with
nuisance because it deprived
the public's right to use the sea was a public
18 9
something essential to human nature.
While Justice Best was refermng to the prevention of the public's use of
the sea for fishing and navigational purposes, the public's use of the
beach has been extended to include recreation and conservation. In cases
like Carter,Marks, Just, and Matthews, the courts have held that interference with lands held in the public trust is a nuisance and can be regulated or enjoined. 190 The reasoning employed by these cases led one
commentator to suggest that "public trust law is perhaps the strongest
contemporary expression of the idea that the legal rights of nature and of
lina, another party bringing this action was the League of Women Voters. Private parties
can bring actions against people who are causing harm to the lands held in the public
trust. See also Hughes, 399 S.E.2d at 24 (Hughes brings action to prevent Nelson's obstruction of navigable canal).
183. 314 S.E.2d 327 (S.C. 1984).
184. Id. at 329.
185. Id. at 329 n.2.
186. See supra note 171.
187. Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Aid. 268, 106 Eng.Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821), quoted in
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364.
188. Blundell, 5 B. & Aid at 283-84, 106 Eng.Rep. at 1196 quoted in Matthews, 471
A.2d at 364.
189. Blundell, 5 B. & Aid at 287, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1197, quoted in Matthews, 471 A.2d
at 364-65.
190. An earlier case where this principle is stated is California v. Gold Run Ditch and
Mining Co., 4 P 1152 (Cal. 1884). In Gold Run, the court held that the "invasion of the
rights of the public to navigate the water flowing over the soil is a public nuisance; and an
unauthorized encroachment upon the soil itself is known in the law as a purpresture." Id.
at 1155.
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future generations are enforceable against contemporary users."'1 91
Lucas' property is not under the high tide mark on a tidal navigable
stream. Lucas' property is not public trust land. However, his property
is adjacent to land held u1 the public trust and ins land is necessary to
gain full use of the public trust land. By building on his land and by
building devices to protect against erosion, Lucas and others are causing
the dimimshing of land held in the public trust. This interference with
the public trust is a nuisance.
In State ex rel. Templeton v. Goodnight,192 a landowner had erected a
fence that made entrance to the beaches impossible. 193 The Texas
Supreme Court held that even though the fences were not on the public
land but on private land, this was a nuisance and a purpresture 1 94 "In
so far as the fences alleged in the petition interfere with the sale or lease
of public lands, the petition shows an injury to the public as an aggregate
public body; they affect all alike." 195 Thus, while Lucas' property is not
public trust land, because of its location and because of its effects on the
land held u1 trust, building on Lucas' property is a nuisance.
C. Protection of the Environment: A Nuisance Against the Land Itself
Justice Holmes once stated that "a river is more than an amenity, it is
a treasure."'196 For many years, Holmes words were forgotten. The natural resources in this country were pillaged without concern of the effects
of such use. However, for the last twenty-five years, people have become
more knowledgeable about environmental issues, and the legislatures of
many states have responded to this concern. In 1967, Marinette County
u1 Wisconsin adopted a shoreline zoning ordinance m1 order to protect
the wetlands. 97 The regulation restricted certain uses of the land mcluding relocation of any watercourse, filling, draining, or dredging the wetlands and removal of topsoil.1 98 The Justs, who had purchased the land
several years before the regulation was passed, brought a suit claiming
191. Rogers, Bringing People Back- Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Takings in
Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205, 239-40 (1982).
192. 11 S.W 119 (Tex. 1888).
193. Id.
194. A purpresture is "an encroachment upon public rights and easements by approIt is not necessarily a
priation to private use of that which belongs to the public.
[A] purpresture may exist without putting the public to any inconpublic nuisance.
venience whatever." BLACKS LAW DiCTIONARY 1236 (6th ed. 1990). South Carolina
recognizes an action in purpresture but the case law is limited and the cases revolve
around people who build structures on land owned by the state that is adjacent to highways. See Anknim v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 159 S.E.2d 911 (S.C. 1968).
The author has chosen not to discuss the possibility that Lucas' proposed structure would
be a purpresture. For a more extensive discussion of purpresture law, see Finnel, supra
note 169.
195. Goodnight, 11 S.W at 119.
196. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
197. Just, 201 N.W.2d at 764.
198. Id. at 766 n.3.
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that their property was taken without compensation after Ronald Just
was fined for filling in the property without obtaining a permit. 199 The
court addressed the taking claim, frammg the issue as a conflict "between
the public interest in stoppmg the despoliation of natural resources
and an owner's asserted right to use his property as he wishes."2"
In addressing the question of whether there was a taking, the court
asked the larger question: "Is the ownership of a parcel of land so absolute that man can change its nature to suit any of his purposes?"20 1 Instead of giving the typical answer, that a prohibition on the use of
property that causes injury to the commumty cannot be deemed a taking,
the court went one step further. "An owner of land has no absolute and
unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as
to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and
which injures the rights of others."'2 2 Although this property may have
greater economic value as habitable property, it may not be developed.20 3
In a similar case, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a prohibition barring dredging in the marshlands was not a taking because the
activity was a nuisance and a prohibition to abate a nuisance cannot be a
taking.2 "4 Just and the line of cases that follow it stand for the principle
that building on wetlands, floodplains, woodlands and beaches and other
ecologically sensitive lands is a nuisance. But why is this development a
nuisance? As previously stated, it is a nuisance to build on land unsuited
for development. It is also a nuisance to interfere with lands held for the
public trust. However, Just and its progeny also stand for a greater pnnciple. To destroy these ecologically sensitive lands is a nuisance to the
land itself.
In 1984, the South Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity to
decide whether the state's policy of controlling and restricting the filling
of wetlands was an unconstitutional taking. 20 5 Citing Just,the court held

that the regulation was not a taking.
While unquestionably respondent's wetland would have greater value
to him if it were filled, "[a]n owner of the land has no absolute right to
199. Id. at 766.
200. Id. at 767.
201. Id. at 768.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 293 A.2d 241 (Md.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972). Many state courts have followed the rationale of Just
and Potomac in deciding that statutes preventing certain land development are not unconstitutional takings of property. See Maple Leaf Investors v. State Dep't of Ecology,
565 P.2d 1162 (Wash. 1977) (regulation prohibiting human dwellings in floodplain was
not a taking but a valid exercise of police power); Turnpike Realty Co., Inc. v. Dedham,
284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972) (flood plain zoning was necessary to reduce the damage to
life and property caused by flooding), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Pope v. City of
Atlanta, 249 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1978) (nuisance to build in floodplain because erosion increases the risk of flooding), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979).
205. Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327 (S.C. 1984).
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change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a
purpose for which it was
2 0 6 unsuited in its natural state and which injures
the rights of others."
Thus, under the common law of South Carolina, development of environmentally protected property is a nuisance. Lucas' proposed construction on the Isle of Palms is a nuisance per se and can be regulated
without compensation.

IV
A.

CONCLUSION

The Decision in Favor of Lucas

On remand, The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that the
"Coastal Council has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists
by which it could restrain Lucas' desired use of his land; nor has our
research uncovered any such common law principle. ' 20 7 There are three
possible reasons for the court's decision m favor of Lucas. As previously
discussed, Lucas came down from the Supreme Court with what seems
to be strict instructions that the South Carolina Supreme Court was not
to find background common law principles supporting the State's position. 20 8 Given these instructions, the court was not likely to hold in
favor of the Coastal Council. Instead, the court took an intermediate
position, finding only that a temporary taking had occurred.20 9 The
damages suffered by four years of delay are not likely to reach the level of
damages imtially found by the trial court. Lucas had not even started
construction on the two houses in 1988.
Beyond this "damage control" theory, there is a more substantial reason why the court felt that South Carolina was unable to show background principles of common law nuisance. In 1990, as a result of
Hurricane Hugo, the state amended the BMA to allow property owners
to appeal Coastal Council decisions. The BMA had originally prevented
all new construction and all rebuilding of destroyed houses. There were
no exceptions. However, after Hurricane Hugo, the State was faced with
thousands of potential takings claims by property owners whose homes
had been destroyed, claims which the Coastal Council felt would bankrupt the state.2 10 Instead of enforcing the law, "the Coastal Council
houses that were
ruled that more than ninety percent of the beachfront
'2 1
seriously damaged could be repaired or rebuilt." 1
206. Id. at 329 (quoting Just, 201 N.W.2d at 768.).
207. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, LEXIS 236, at *4-5
(S.C. 1992).
208. See supra note 95.
209. Lucas, LEXIS 236 at *5.
210. Mary T. Schmich, After Hugo, Residents Rebuild in Spite of Law, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 15, 1990, at C12.
211. Id. In addition, the South Carolina Supreme Court has nullified tests set up by the
Coastal Council that would have prevented certain rebuilding because these tests interfere with the permit application process. "Coastal Council's damage assessment test has

320

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT [Vol. IV

In Lucas, Justice Scalia wrote that it was unlikely that the BMA was
enacted for safety purposes because m application, the BMA did not prevent the construction of many houses on the beach.
Justice Blackmun
[who relies on the harm-preventing characteristics of the BMA, sees] no significance in the fact that the statute permts owners of existing structures to remain (and even to rebuild if
their structures are not "destroyed beyond repair,") and in the fact
that the 1990 amendment authorizes the Council to issue2 permits
for
2
new construction in violation of the uniform prohibition. '
Why should one property owner be prevented from constructing a house
when his neighbors are allowed to live in their houses? The same safety
justifications exist for all of the lots.
The setback program, as envisioned, made sense so long as it was uniformly applied. New houses were not going to be built, and as the existing buildings aged or were destroyed by storms, the owners were not
going to be able to rebuild. This was a cost-efficient program because the
state would not have to compensate the landowners. If there was to be
any compensation, it would come from the insurance companies for the
destruction of property resulting from storms. 2 13 Thus, over a thirty
year period, the setback plan would clear the homeowners off the beach.
This plan was more "just" than the two alternatives: (1) conceding that
the beaches were lost; or (2) forcibly removing the property owners from
their property and destroying the houses. However, South Carolina was
unable to apply the law consistently, and it became impossible, if not
hypocritical, to argue that preventing one landowner from building was
in the interest of public safety For this reason, the South Carolina
Supreme Court was forced to concede that the primary purpose of the
BMA was not to prevent a nuisance.
It is also important to note the personnel change in the South Carolina
Supreme Court and the effect of this change on the case. The first South
Carolina Supreme Court decision was decided by a 3-2 majority Were
this majority intact, the author believes that the court, on remand, would
have held for the Coastal Council. The majority felt that the facts in
Lucas were similar to those in Carter,and the court was not prepared to
overrule Carter.2 4 Further, the language of the opinion indicates that
the court felt that the BMA was enacted to prevent serious risks to life
and property Most important, however, was the court's recognition that
the public trust doctrine may present a means "to regulate [the] private
property immediately adjacent to the public property which sits below
been critical to the evaluation of permit applications to rebuild seawalls." Captain's
Quarters Motor Inn, Inc. v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 413 S.E.2d 13, 14 (S.C.
1991).
212. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898 n.l (citations omitted).
213. The property owners presumably would take their settlement money and move to
where their homes could not damage the environment.
214. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 901.
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The 3-2 majority no longer existed when the case was decided on remand. Shortly after the decision, Chief Judge Gregory, a member of the
majority, left the court and the Chief Judge position was filled by Judge
Harwell, one of the dissenters. There is no doubt that this change was
instrumental in the decision on remand.
B.

The Future of Environmental Regulations

In 1968, one writer analogized environmental degradation to the communal use of a grazing pasture.2 16 A pasture can only handle a certain
number of cows. But in what he called the "tragedy of the commons,"
Hardin wrote that each person wishing to utilize the common grazing
pasture will try to add more cows to his herd even though the commons
will be diminished. 217 The herdsman that does so will receive the full
value of one cow but the detriment will be shared equally by all
herdsmen. 211 Therefore all herdsman are encouraged to add more cows
and must continue to add cows in order to remain in competition.21 9
The result is that the common resource is destroyed.
Hardin concludes
'220
that "[flreedom in a commons brings rum to all."
Like Hardin's herdsmen, Lucas and the other beachfront property developers built beyond the beaches' capacity When they realized that the
beaches were eroding, the developers built erosion controls and brought
m sand to nourish the beach. But these erosion controls did more damage than good and the erosion worsened. The common was quickly bemg destroyed. In 1988, the State of South Carolina recognized that its
program to protect the beaches and dunes had failed. By enacting the
Beachfront Management Act, the State was continuing a program that it
had started over ten years before. South Carolina was committed to restoring its beaches. The series of Lucas cases may have ended beach conservation m South Carolina.
Lucas presents serious stumbling blocks for states that seek to amend
their environmental protection statutes or to create new statutes. Many
states have their own setback programs, each designed to prevent the
harms described by the South Carolina General Assembly However,
Lucas provides one exception in regulatory takings cases. Where the regulation is to prevent a common law nuisance, the state can regulate to the
point even where there is no economic value.
This Comment has identified three forms of nuisance that states can
215. Id. at 896 n.i.
216. Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (While
focusing on population control, Hardin discusses the problem of the unlimited use of
commons such as the western ranges and the oceans).
217. Id. at 1244.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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identify in order to meet the Lucas test: (1) the beach is an inappropriate
place to build a house. Tius construction causes the dunes to erode, leadmg to the loss of life and property; (2) the beaches are lands held m the
public trust, and the destruction of these lands is a nuisance; and (3) the
destruction of the wetlands and the dunes is a nuisance to the land itself.
The first two theories are well founded in law. The third theory represents this author's belief that it is unconscionable to destroy the remainder of the precious resources that still exist in this country While this
theory is based on a loose reading of certain common law cases, it also
rests on no lesser authority than Locke who understood that "nothing
was made by God for man to spoil or destroy."22' 1
Under these three theories, states will be able to regulate the use of
certain threatened lands as long as they apply the law uniformly. If protecting the public safety is the justification for the law, the regulation
must be tailored to meet this justification. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided that the regulation on Lucas' property was a
taking, but the fight to preserve the beaches does not end with this decision. It is no longer affordable to disregard the dangers of uncontested
expansion and to presume that all property is developable. To do so
would be to destroy the commons, gaining profit for no one.
Todd D. Brody
221. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690).

